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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 “But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without 
having in itself the power to preserve property… and all this for the 
preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is 
possible.”1 – John Locke 
 
 John Locke’s theories on the natural right to property and the 
government’s role in protecting those rights are foundational principles of 
the Anglo-American legal system. 2  These legal assurances serve an 
invaluable function in the modern free market by preserving personal 
gains from adverse interests. Undoubtedly, the quintessential piece of 
personal property in the 21st century is the homestead. Despite its 
importance, this asset has suffered from inconsistent and ineffective state-
based legislation across the United States, hindering economic recovery. 
This hindrance spawns from an ineffective system of state regulation that 
overly burdens mortgages and mortgage securities. As the greatest cause 
of diminished property values in the United States, foreclosure is an 
affective area of law that requires thoughtful legislation. 3  In fact, 
foreclosure sales decrease individual property values, lower surrounding 
community property values, and create ripple effects throughout the real 
estate market.4 Wall Street is also directly affected by foreclosures through 
the diminution in value of mortgage-backed securities.5 Yet, despite its 
national significance, foreclosure regulation has largely been controlled by 
state legislatures and courts, leading to large discrepancies in both 
procedural and substantive law.6 The recent passage of federal foreclosure 
legislation, however, ushers in a new era of personal property rights 
protection in America.   
 Before discussing recent American developments, it is imperative 
to understand the history of the Anglo-American legal system as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Chap VII, §87-88 (1690).  
2 Chester Antieau, Natural Rights and the Founding Fathers-The Virginians, 17 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 43 (1960). 
3 Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Value of Foreclosed Property, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS WORKING PAPER SERIES, WORKING PAPER 2004-022A (Sept. 2004).   
4 Id. 
5 See generally Gary Madich, Gregory Reed, Scott Thomas, Kent Weber, Foreclosure 
Delays: Potential Impacts and Opportunities in the Aon-agency MBS Market, J.P. 
MORGAN ASSET MANAGEMENT INSIGHTS (October 2010), 
http://www.jpmorganinstitutional.com/blobcontent/184/768/1288220108979_INSIGHTS
_Foreclosure_Delays.pdf; see also Grant Nelson & Dale Whitman, Reforming 
Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act,  53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1406-1408 
(2004). 
6 Elizabeth Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILL. L. REV. 509 (2010); John Mixon & 
Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief for Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section 511(b), 
27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455, 482 (1992) (“Uniformity is essential for efficient 
secondary market operation [because it allows investors] to assess portfolio values on a 
rate-of-return basis without worrying about jurisdictional differences....”).  
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the basics of land finance law. The first section of this article will set the 
background on three important topics: land finance history, current United 
Kingdom foreclosure law, and current American foreclosure practice. 
After establishing a background on these topics, the article will examine 
newly passed legislation and newly formed regulatory agencies in the 
United States. Finally, the article will take a comparative look at the 
United States and United Kingdom regulatory schemes, in order to better 
understand the advantages and pitfalls of each system. It is because the 
United States and United Kingdom have distinct legal systems with a 
common origin that this comparative analysis can capitalize on the success 
and failures of their independent regulatory developments. Much like our 
founding fathers borrowed principles from the early English legal system; 
the United States can glean from the regulatory steps taken in the United 
Kingdom to improve the American foreclosure landscape. 
 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
 A. Anglo-American Land Finance History 
 
 Despite its current widespread usage, the personal property 
mortgage is a relatively new development in the context of real estate 
finance. Prior to 1916, banks and financial institutions rarely gave loans to 
individual borrowers for the purchase of real estate.7 The emergence of 
personal property mortgages arose from the demand for private 
homeownership in the newly formed middle class of the early 20th 
century. 8  This new and expanding socioeconomic class encompassed 
individuals with skilled professions, moderate salaries, and limited access 
to capital. The middle class sought to break the landlord-tenant 
relationship that dominated the 19th century and enjoy the benefits of 
owning private property.9 With the establishment of an effective banking 
system, government subsidies,10 and large amounts of available capital for 
financial institutions, the personal mortgage became an instrument 
intended to benefit both creditor and borrower.  
 The mortgage relationship operates substantially the same in both 
the United States and the United Kingdom. It begins with an interested 
buyer for a piece of real property who cannot personally finance the 
transaction. Therefore, the prospective buyer must secure a loan in order 
to complete the purchase. Since the buyer has limited capital, the lending 
institution requires collateral in order to ensure repayment of the principal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 THOMAS HERZOG, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, HISTORY OF MORTGAGE 
FINANCE WITH AN EMPHASIS ON MORTGAGE INSURANCE (2009). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. (Examples of U.S. Government subsidies include those provided by: Federal 
Housing Administration, Veterans Affairs Office, Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), and the Home Loan Bank Board.).  
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on the loan. This is secured by the very property being purchased, in 
conjunction with a promissory note or deed of trust. In both the United 
States and United Kingdom, the creation of a mortgage contract creates a 
relationship with several equitable and legal interests.11  
The mortgagor, or the buyer of the property – also the borrower on 
the loan – is bound to a covenant to repay the loan secured by the 
property, a right to possession of the property, an equitable and legal right 
to redemption, and the right to collect rent or improve the land.12 The 
mortgagee, or the institution making the loan, retains a similar legal right 
to redemption, a covenant to be repaid, a legal right to foreclosure, and in 
some cases, a power of sale. 13  The foreclosure right represents the 
mortgagee’s ability to foreclose the mortgagor’s legal and equitable right 
to redemption in the secured property after the principal of the loan 
becomes due.14 By extinguishing the right to redemption, the mortgagee 
can “take the mortgaged property and treat it as his own, free from any 
right for the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage.”15 Depending on the 
jurisdiction and the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagee may also have a 
power of sale.  
 Another modern trend in land finance has been the development of 
mortgage servicing companies. Historically, while loans were serviced by 
the holder of the note, the current trend among large financial institutions 
has been to outsource day-to-day servicing of the loan to outside 
companies.16 These companies are responsible for collecting and crediting 
monthly loan payments, handling an escrow account if necessary, and 
handling default related services should the borrower fail to make monthly 
payments.17  In response, both countries have formed regulations that 
directly address the servicing of a loan. The addition of mortgage servicers 
creates another layer of complication for homeowners. In fact, the transfer 
of loans between mortgage servicers has been a recent source of abusive 
practices, prompting additional regulatory responses.18 
Modern financial institutions have also found creative ways of 
further leveraging mortgages by creating mortgage-backed securities. By 
pooling large amounts of mortgages together, financial companies can 
issue “claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers 
on the loans.”19 Although American and British firms both securitize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See generally MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET’S LAW OF BANKING (11th ed. 1996). 
12 THOMAS JEFFERIES, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (Lord Mackay ed., 5th ed. 2008). 
13 Id. at 189. 
14 Hapgood, supra note 11 at 614. 
15 Id.  
16 Janean Chun, The 5 Biggest Mortgage Servicing Traps, DAILYFINANCE.COM, Nov. 21, 
2009, http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/11/21/the-5-biggest-mortgage-servicing-traps/. 
17 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MAKING PAYMENTS TO YOUR MORTGAGE SERVICER, 
available at http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0190-making-payments-your-
mortgage-servicer (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).   
18 Id. 
19 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
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mortgages, the 2008 United States subprime mortgage market was 
responsible for one of the largest economic crises in history.20 From over 
inflated property values to questionable lending practices, the subprime 
mortgage crisis highlighted many flaws in the mortgage relationship and 
its disjointed regulation.21 Sadly, until recently, little has been done to 
remedy the issues that created this crisis 22  and the current state of 
American foreclosure law continues to drag on the economy. Without 
improvements, the ineffective regulatory system will have a cyclical effect 
on our economy.  
 
 
 B.  Foreclosure Law in the United Kingdom 
 Homeownership has gained increasing popularity in the United 
Kingdom since the advent of the First World War.23 As of 2011, the 
overall homeownership rate in England and Whales was 64 percent.24 
Among these homeowners, approximately 37.3 percent have property 
debt.25 In other terms, fewer than two in five households in the United 
Kingdom have a mortgage. 26  Unlike the United States, the United 
Kingdom has a variety of legislation that regulates the mortgage 
relationship at a national level.  
The Law of Property Act (“LPA”) enacted in 1925 was a 
foundational piece of legislation that regulated mortgages. After passage 
of the LPA, mortgages could only be created through a legal charge in the 
deed that created rights and duties at law.27 Prior to the adoption of the 
LPA, the courts devised a structure of competing rights: the right to 
redemption of the property was given to the mortgagee and the equity of 
redemption was given to the mortgagor.28 These rights continue to exist 
through the common law despite the passage of the LPA, other legislation, 
or even the intent of the parties.29 Another major change brought about by 
the LPA is the introduction of a power of sale independent of the language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Noah Karley, Christine Whitehead, The Mortgage-Backed Securities Market in the 
U.K.: Developments Over the Last Few Years, HOUSING FINANCE INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.housingfinance.org/uploads/Publicationsmanager/0212_UKM.pdf; see also 
Pennington-Cross, supra note 3.   
21 Pennington-Cross, supra note 3.  
22 Brown, supra note 6. 
23 Sam Marsden, Home Ownership Falls for First Time in Nearly 100 Years – ONS, THE 




25 Mona Chalabi, Mortgages: How Many Britons Have One, and How Much Do They 




27 Hapgood, supra note 11, at 586-587. 
28 Id. at 586. 
29 Id.  
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used in the mortgage.30 The power of sale allows the mortgagee to sell the 
property free from the mortgagor’s right of redemption and apply the 
proceeds toward the balance owed on the loan. Unlike the foreclosure 
right, the power of sale can be exercised without involving the courts.31 In 
respect of this powerful tool for mortgagees, the courts have imposed a 
duty on lenders to act in good faith when exercising the power of sale.32 
The creation of an inherent power of sale creates uniformity in foreclosure 
practice by defining the procedural device used to recoup the outstanding 
principal. This is done at a national level in the United Kingdom, 
something that varies drastically in the United States from state to state.   
 Prior to 2011, the United Kingdom had left regulation of the 
mortgage-creating financial institutions to the Financial Services 
Authority (“FSA”).33 The FSA was one part of a tripartite system of 
regulation that included the Bank of England and the Treasury.34 The 
three-part regulatory system was unsuccessful, with critics stating, “no one 
had sufficient responsibility for critical issues, and thus, no regulator was 
in a position to recognize the coming of the crisis and prevent or react to 
it.”35 In place of this fractured regulatory system, British lawmakers 
sought to consolidate agencies with specific roles and power to enforce 
their provisions. In 2011, the United Kingdom created the Financial 
Conduct Authority (“FCA”), a body of the Treasury, with the principal 
purpose of “facilitating efficiency and choice in the market for financial 
services; securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers; and 
protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system.”36 
In addition to legislation regulating foreclosure procedural tools, 
the FCA, established a code of conduct sourcebook for lending institutions 
with mortgage business customers.37 The Mortgages and Home Finance: 
Conduct of Business sourcebook (“MCOB”) sets rules and regulations for 
lenders in their course of business with mortgagors. In particular, MCOB 
13 regulates conduct for arrears and repossessions.38 This section of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Id. at 609. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 611 (describing the duty as something less than “fiduciary.” The duty follows the 
‘neighbor principle’ in English law). 
33 Daniel Lamb, A Specter is Haunting the Financial Industry – The Specter of the Global 
Financial Crisis: A Comment on the Imminent Expansion of Consumer Financial 
Protection in the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union, 31 J. NAT'L 
ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 213, 247 (2011).   
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 248. 
36 Id. at 250.   
37 See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, HOW WE OPERATE (last visited Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/about/governance; see also FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, 
MORTGAGES AND HOME FINANCE: CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK (“MCOB”), 
http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/MCOB (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
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sourcebook provides clear instructions to financial institutions when 
dealing with defaulting borrowers. In particular, MCOB 13.3.2A provides  
“A firm must, when dealing with any 
customer in payment difficulties: (1) make 
reasonable efforts to reach an agreement 
with a customer over the method of repaying 
and payment shortfall or sale shortfall, in the 
case of the former having regard to the 
desirability of agreeing with the customer an 
alternative to taking possession of the 
property; (2) liaise, if the customer makes 
arrangements for this, with third party 
source of advice regarding payment of 
shortfall or sale shortfall; (3) allow a 
reasonable time over which the payment 
shortfall or sale shortfall should be repaid, 
having particular regard to the need to 
establish, where feasible, a payment plan 
which is practical in terms of the 
circumstances of the customer; (4) grant, 
unless it has good reason not to do so, a 
customer’s request for a change to: (a) the 
date on which the payment is due (providing 
it is within the same payment period); or (b) 
the method by which payment is made; (5) 
where no reasonable payment arrangement 
can be made, allow the customer to remain 
in possession for a reasonable period to 
effect a sale; and (6) not repossess the 
property unless all other reasonable 
attempts to resolve the position have 
failed.”39 
 
MCOB 13.3.2A represents many of the obligations placed on 
mortgagees from the duty arising from the power of sale. Moreover, 
failure to follow the rules set forth in the MCOB is punishable by fines, 
injunctions, and even criminal prosecutions. 40  The MCOB further 
regulates repossessions of mortgaged property. 41  This provision 
incorporates the previously mentioned requirements while also obliging 
the mortgagee to contact local authorities and establish whether the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. (Arrears and repossessions: regulated mortgage contracts and home purchase plans 
(emphasis added)). 
40 See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, HOW WE ENFORCE THE LAW, 
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/enforcement/how-we-enforce-the-law (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
41 MCOB, supra note 37, § 13.4.5. 
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customer is eligible for local authority housing after eviction.42 While 
these regulations may seem excessive, or even inconsequential, they do 
more than provide borrowers procedural protections: they define the 
relationship and the corresponding duty owed by mortgagors.   
Besides repossession through the power of sale, the mortgagee 
may also recoup the principal balance of an unpaid mortgage debt through 
foreclosure. The power to foreclose the mortgagor’s equity of redemption 
can only be achieved through a court order and is therefore used 
sparingly. 43  By seeking a foreclosure in the United Kingdom, the 
mortgagee extinguishes the mortgagor’s rights to the property and places 
all legal rights and interests with the mortgagee, even if the property value 
is in excess of the principal on the loan.44 There is a two-stage process for 
foreclosure actions brought by mortgagees. “First, the court will make a 
nisi order giving the mortgagor a fixed period, usually six months, to pay 
off the outstanding amounts. The mortgagee’s power of sale is suspended 
during this period. If the mortgagor does not pay off the debt in the 
prescribed period, the order will be made absolute.”45 After a nisi order 
has been given, the court effectively extends the deadline of repayment on 
the loan and the mortgagor retains possession of the property.46 Like the 
MCOB regulations, the mortgagee must extend the mortgagor certain 
opportunities to renegotiate the terms of the loan during this prescribed 
period.47 
However, these various regulations and protections have not 
always been in place.  In fact, before the financial crisis of 2008, both the 
United States and the United Kingdom engaged in a regulatory “race to 
the bottom,” “on the grounds that it was necessary to maintain or increase 
their competitive positions.”48 Much like the “race to the bottom” engaged 
by multi-national firms seeking the cheapest labor price, financial 
institutions also move their businesses to countries with favorable or little 
regulatory oversight. While this deregulation may be beneficial in the 
short term, the devastation created by the 2008 financial collapse 
highlights the risks associated with such tactics. In fact, since the collapse 
of the American subprime mortgage market, the United Kingdom financial 
regulatory system has undergone substantial restructuring.49   
With updated and reorganized protections in place, the rate of 
repossession and foreclosure in the United Kingdom is now very low. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 MCOB, supra note 37, § 13.4.5 (2). 
43 Mark Harrison, Repossession vs. Foreclosure in the UK-The Big Myths, 
EZINEARTICLES.COM, http://ezinearticles.com/?Repossession-vs.-Foreclosure-In-The-UK-
--The-Big-Myths&id=404151 (last visited Jan. 20, 2014); see also Hapgood, supra note 
11, at 614. 
44 Hapgood, supra note 11, at 614. 
45 Id.  
46 Jefferies, supra note 12, at 350. 
47 Id. 
48 Brown, supra note 6, at 563.   
49 Id.  
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Council of Mortgage Lenders, a non-profit trade association for the 
mortgage lending industry, put the rate of repossession of all properties for 
the third quarter of 2013 at 0.06 percent.50 The rate of repossessions 
continues to decrease despite the expiration of several government 
programs instituted in 2009 to help defaulting mortgagors.51 The effects of 
the United Kingdom’s regulations are the result of one overarching policy 
decision: to prevent foreclosures and repossessions by creating significant 
statutory, regulatory, and judicial safeguards. In response, securing a 
mortgage in the United Kingdom has become increasingly difficult.52 
Lenders require substantial down payments, significantly higher interest 
rates than those set by the government, and proof of income from 
mortgagors.53 Despite these significant obstacles, homeownership rates are 
similar to that of the United States.  
 
C. Foreclosure Law in the United States 
 
As previously stated, homeownership rates in the United States are 
similar to those found in the United Kingdom. In fact, as of November 
2013, the homeownership rate in the United States was 65.3 percent, or 
1.3 percent more than in the United Kingdom.54 While the homeownership 
rate is similar between the countries, the rate of repossession or 
foreclosure is quite different. As of October 2013, there were 1,252,416 
properties at some stage of foreclosure in the United States, or 0.102 
percent of all homes.55 This is almost double the rate of repossessed and 
foreclosed properties in the United Kingdom (0.06 percent).56 In addition 
to an increased rate of foreclosure, the effect of foreclosure on the 
underlying property value is substantial. As of September 2013, the 
median sale price of foreclosed homes was $74,900 less than the median 
sale price of non-foreclosed homes during the same period.57 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 COUNCIL OF MORTGAGE LENDERS, ARREARS AND REPOSSESSIONS CONTINUE TO FALL, 
SAYS CML (“CML Report”), Nov. 14, 2013, 
http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/media/press/3731 (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (noting that this 
is the lowest recorded level since the organization began reporting the statistic in 2008). 
51 Alan White, Foreclosure Crisis in Europe vs. US, CREDITSLIPS.COM, (last visited Jan. 
20, 2014), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/08/foreclosure-crisis-in-europe-vs-
us.html. 





54 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS CB13-173,  NOV. 5, 
2013, http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf. 
55 National Real Estate Trends and Market Info. (“Trends and Market Info”), 
REALTYTRAC.COM, http://www.realtytrac.com/statsandtrends/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2014); 
see also Foreclosure Trends, REALTYTRAC.COM, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/statsandtrends/foreclosuretrends (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
56 CML Report, supra note 50. 
57 Trends and Market Info, supra note 55. 
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Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States has largely avoided 
passing national-level legislation regulating the mortgage relationship. For 
example, only twenty-one states required judicial foreclosure as of 2006.58 
In practice, these twenty-one states require a mortgagee to pursue 
repossession of a defaulted property through a lawsuit in court. The other 
twenty-nine states do not require judicial involvement in order for a home 
to be repossessed and eventually sold. Other states, such as California, do 
not even use the mortgage instrument, but require a deed of trust that 
operates similarly to mortgage and usually involves a third-party, 
escrow.59 
While the LPA provided the power of sale for every mortgage in 
the United Kingdom, this is not incorporated into every mortgage 
agreement by statute in the United States. However, many mortgages and 
deeds of trust in the United States contain power of sale provisions as part 
of the agreement.60 These provisions are only valid in states that do not 
require judicial foreclosures and allow the mortgagee to sell the property 
without having to go to court.61 Despite these provisions, several states, 
including New York, have passed legislation regulating a sale under these 
circumstances.62 Lenders prefer settling borrower defaults by power of 
sale provisions because they are often cheaper and less time consuming 
than seeking judicial action.63 
Another peculiar aspect of the American foreclosure landscape is 
the existence of quasi-governmental entities such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. In 1970, Freddie Mac was commissioned by Congress to 
regulate and assist the secondary mortgage market.64 In addition, these 
entities also guarantee mortgage-backed securities and help prevent 
foreclosure by assisting homeowners. 65  However, their guarantees of 
mortgage securities during the early 2000s led directly to a financial 
collapse costing taxpayers $189 billion in bailout funds.66 In response to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Kelly Edmiston & Roger Zalneraitis, Rising Foreclosures in the United States: A 
Perfect Storm, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
FOURTH QUARTER 2007 (2007).   
59 Cam Merritt, What Is a Deed of Trust in California?, S.F. GATE,  
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/deed-trust-california-9088.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
60 Power of Sale Clause, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW 
SCHOOL, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/power_of_sale_clause (last visited Jan. 20, 
2014). 
61 Id. 
62 N.Y. RPA. LAW § 1405. 
63 Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 58. 
64 FREDDIE MAC, COMPANY PROFILE, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/?intcmp=AFCP (last visited Jan. 
20, 2014). 
65 Id., see also FANNIE MAE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/governance/corporate-governance.html (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
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their mismanagement, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed 
under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Administration 
in 2008.67 While flawed, these organizations serve an invaluable function 
in the American mortgage market: bringing stability to a highly irregular 
and unevenly-regulated market. Whereas mortgages in the United 
Kingdom are all subject to substantially similar regulations, mortgages in 
the United States are subject to different laws that vary drastically from 
state to state. These quasi-governmental organizations ensure financial 
institutions can buy and sell mortgages regardless of the state they 
originated from or under what legal assurances they were given. Without 
these organizations, it would be exceedingly difficult to compare the value 
of a mortgage issued in California, to one issued in New York as they are 
“guaranteed” under different jurisdictions with varying procedural and 
substantive laws.68  
While foreclosure practice remains distinct in each state, Congress 
has attempted regulating the foreclosure process through federal 
legislation. Their first attempt was the Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act 
(“FMFA”) as part of The Housing Act of 1973.69 Although supported by 
the Nixon administration, this failed bill would have provided a 
foreclosure by power of sale for any “mortgage made, owned, insured, 
guaranteed by any federal instrumentality.”70 In 1995, a similar bill was 
proposed that would have enacted statutory foreclosure by a power of sale 
remedy for all mortgages insured or guaranteed by the federal 
government.71 These bills failed to attract popular support in Congress for 
several reasons. First, both bills were heavy-handed attempts to dictate a 
specific federal foreclosure process, thereby trampling state’s rights.  
Instead of bills that mandate specific foreclosure procedures, a federal 
foreclosure bill should seek to define the substantive relationship between 
the parties. Not only would this preserve state’s rights, but is more likely 
to garner popular support amongst lawmakers who oppose federal 
government intrusion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Id. 
68 Since New York is a judicial foreclosure state and California allows non-judicial 
foreclosure, the actual amount paid back on the principal can be vastly different. In non-
judicial foreclosures, usually executed through a power of sale, the mortgagee gives up 
the right to seek a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor. See Mark S. Pécheck and 
Kelsey M. Lestor, The ABCs of California Foreclosure, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, January 
2012, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/PecheckLestor-
ABCsofCAForclosureLaw.pdf. Therefore, if the mortgagee exercises a power of sale and 
the underlying property is sold for less than the amount owed on the loan, the actual 
value of the mortgage instrument will be less than the agreed upon principal, or face 
value of the note.   
69 Nelson and Whitman, supra note 5, at 1411. 
70 Id. 
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Another attempt at regulating foreclosure practice has come from 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the 
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (“UNFA”).72 This proposal gained 
support from “some of the nation’s leading real estate finance practitioners 
and scholars.”73 Again, much like the failed congressional bills, the UNFA 
sought to create specific foreclosure procedures in order to bring 
uniformity. In particular, the UNFA outlined “three methods of 
nonjudicial foreclosure and permit[ed] the secured creditor to elect the 
method to be used.” 74  While innovative, these specific procedural 
proposals stand no chance of approval in Congress.  In fact, since the Act 
was promulgated in 2002, it has failed to be enacted by Congress despite 
pressure from the Uniform Law Commission.    
The United Kingdom was not the only country that passed new 
financial regulation in the wake of the subprime mortgage market collapse 
in 2008. In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”).75 As opposed to previous attempts at direct federal legislation 
regulating the mortgage market and foreclosure process, Dodd-Frank 
sought to “curb, in large part, the trend toward federalization of consumer 
financial protection through bolstering state control over regulation.”76 
The legislation provided a right of action for state’s attorney general to 
bring civil actions against financial institutions to enforce the regulations 
in Dodd-Frank.77  While Dodd-Frank adds some level of protection and 
uniformity to the foreclosure landscape, it suffers from the same systemic 
issues in American foreclosure governance. By deferring significant 
responsibility to state enforcement of financial regulation, lawmakers are 
promoting a dysfunctional regulation system with state-to-state 
differences. For example, because enforcement of these provisions are left 
to the discretionary choice of the states’ attorney general, a violation of 
Dodd-Frank in one state may be subject to enforcement, while the same 
violation in another state could go unpunished. In the competitive real 
estate finance market, this will force lenders and financial institutions to 
seek the state with the lightest enforcement of these provisions. Or, in the 
context of consumer protections, lenders may pursue one course of 
foreclosure in State X, while pursuing another less favorable form of 
foreclosure for the borrower in State Y, where enforcement of Dodd-Frank 
is lacking.   
 As seen, land finance law and foreclosure law have largely been 
left to the states to regulate in America. This often leads to the legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Nelson and Whitman, supra note 5, at 1399.   
73 Nelson and Whitman, supra note 5, at 1402 & n. 2. 
74 UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT SUMMARY, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Nonjudicial%20Foreclosure%20Ac
t (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
75 Lamb, supra note 33, at 237.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
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consultation of a local attorney who can provide the requisite information 
on how to legally proceed in a foreclosure case.78 With federal foreclosure 
legislation, both parties would be assured that the controlling federal 
provisions apply and are guaranteed certain rights and responsibilities 
under the law.79 The current system has created a somewhat dysfunctional 
and inefficient system of governance that affects property values, 
foreclosure rates, and our domestic economy. Despite these effects, 
lawmakers have remained reluctant to create federal legislation regulating 
financial institutions and mortgage markets. While this may be done out of 
respect for American federalism, 21st century banking and foreclosure 
practice requires a new-age approach.   
 
 D.  New Developments in American Foreclosure Law 
 
 In response to the failed attempts by states to regulate foreclosure 
practice and the devastating effects of the financial crisis, lawmakers 
passed substantial federal reforms to foreclosure in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (the “Bureau”), an idea of 
Harvard Law School bankruptcy professor Elizabeth Warren and now 
Democratic Senator from Massachusetts, advocated for greater consumer 
protections in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.80 After a struggling 
start to define its purpose and hire capable individuals, the Bureau began 
taking shape in 2011.81 It was not until the highly contentious January 
recess appointment of Richard Cordray that the Bureau began taking any 
substantive steps.82 Even then, leaders of the organization were slow to 
enforce the newly enacted rules and regulations delegated by Congress, 
waiting for “slam-dunk cases” before taking action.83 Today it boasts of 
several achievements: “a consumer complaint process that has already 
made banks more responsive. A data based method for assessing which 
institutions deserve the most scrutiny … A renewed onslaught of 
enforcement actions. And a record of hitting each rulemaking deadline set 
by Dodd-Frank as it fundamentally reshaped the mortgage market, while 
other agencies let theirs slide.”84 To fully appreciate the Bureau’s role in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See generally John Schoen, Homeowners Battle Banks to Stop Foreclosures… and 
Win, NBCNEWS.COM, Mar. 12, 2012, http://www.nbcnews.com/business/homeowners-
battle-banks-stop-foreclosures-win-403572. 
79 For a more detailed example of the challenges created by varying foreclosure law, see 
Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose 
Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 703 (2008). 
80 Lydia Depillis, A watchdog grows up: The inside story of the Consumer Financial 
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regulating the mortgage market, it is essential to examine the rules and 
regulations that govern this federal agency. 
 Like the Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom, the 
Bureau has been given certain forms of enforcement by the legislature.  
The Bureau’s primary method of enforcement is outlined in 12 U.S.C. § 
5564 entitled “Litigation Authority.” Under the Bureau’s litigation 
authority, it may bring a civil action against those that violate the 
regulations it promulgates.85 It is important to note that the regulatory 
organization must give notice to the Attorney General before taking any 
action.86 In addition to bringing civil actions, the Bureau has a variety of 
relief forms that it may seek. For example, if there is a violation of the 
organization’s rules, then it can seek recession or modification of 
contracts, refunds of money, and even restitution.87 The Bureau can also 
refer matters to criminal proceedings if needed.88 These forms of relief are 
almost identical to the ones offered by the MCOB in the United Kingdom 
to the Financial Conduct Authority. 
 While the Bureau has been granted substantial enforcement 
authority, what the organization actually enforces is radically different 
than what was previously regulated by federal agencies. One of the most 
substantial regulations administered and enforced by the Bureau is the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) of 2011.89 The goal of 
RESPA is to “ensure that consumers throughout the nation are provided 
with more helpful information about the cost of the mortgage settlement 
and [are] protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by 
certain abusive practices.”90 Specifically, Subpart C of RESPA provides 
regulations on mortgage servicing. From setting proscribed periods of time 
in which mortgage servicers must respond to borrowers,91 to establishing 
loss mitigation procedures and timelines, 92  RESPA formalizes the 
relationship between borrowers and lenders under federal law.  Prior to the 
enactment of RESPA, these relationships were left to the states to regulate, 
which often provided little to no guidance in the form of deadlines or 
timetables. The resulting abuses by mortgage servicers included exorbitant 
fees, improperly force-placed insurance, and dual tracking.93 The passage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a) (2010). It is also important to note that the Bureau has its own 
administrative hearings on violations of regulations, but these are largely devoid of any 
real consequence to the violator.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5563 (2010). 
86 12 U.S.C. § 5564(d) (2010). 
87 12 U.S.C. § 5565 (2010). 
88 12 U.S.C. § 5566 (2010). 
89 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, RESPA – REAL ESTATE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT, 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/rmra/res/respa_hm 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
90 Id.  
91 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35. 
92 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41.   
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of RESPA provides nationwide protections for personal mortgage 
consumers that previously did not exist under state law.   
 For example, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(e)(1) states: 
“(1) In general. Subject to paragraphs (e)(2)(ii) and (iii) of 
this section, if a complete loss mitigation application is 
received 90 days or more before a foreclosure sale, a 
servicer may require that a borrower accept or reject an 
offer of a loss mitigation option no earlier than 14 days 
after the servicer provides the offer of a loss mitigation 
option to the borrower. If a complete loss mitigation 
application is received less than 90 days before a 
foreclosure sale, but more than 37 days before a foreclosure 
sale, a servicer may require that a borrower accept or reject 
an offer of a loss mitigation option no earlier than 7 days 
after the servicer provides the offer of a loss mitigation 
option to the borrower.” 
The regulations center around specific timing and procedures that 
borrowers or lenders should use before foreclosure action commences. 
However, these regulations are extremely specific by providing strict 
timetables for borrower and lender responses.  
 Besides RESPA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is 
responsible for administering other important federal regulations, 
previously enforced by a multitude of different agencies. First, the 
organization can now enforce the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
which had previously been under the exclusive control of the Federal 
Trade Commission.94 Second, the Bureau can enforce violations of the 
Truth in Lending Act, which had previously been administered by the 
Federal Reserve Board.95 The consolidation of the enforcement of these 
regulations is the result of the previous failure of the segmented system, 
which led to a division of responsibility and ultimately allowed the 
financial collapse in 2008. 96  As previously mentioned, a similar 
consolidation of power occurred within the Financial Conduct Authority 
in the United Kingdom. By centralizing the enforcement of these 
regulations, it ensures that standards are applied equally nationwide and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014). (Dual tracking occurs when a mortgage servicer 
simultaneously proceeds with foreclosure while loan modification discussions are 
occurring.  This can result in foreclosure before completion of the loan modification 
process). 
94 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/fair-
debt-collection-practices-act-text (last visited Jan. 24, 2014); see also C.F.R. T. 12, Ch. 
X, Pt. 1006. 
95 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REGULATIONS, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm#Z (last visited Jan. 24, 2014); 
see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.1. 
96 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CREATING THE CONSUMER BUREAU, 
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not on a state-by-state basis. This uniformity eliminates much of the 
confusion and mismanagement of a segmented regulatory system; where 
no one segment is ultimately accountable.  
 The idea of federal legislation on the issue of foreclosure is not 
novel. As previously discussed, FAMFA and UNFA were both attempts at 
foreclosure regulation at the national level. While both proposed useful 
changes to American foreclosure practice, they ultimately failed to garner 
congressional support because they attempted to accomplish too much 
through heavy-handed procedural changes.97 In addition to these two 
proposals, there have been numerous articles that suggest federal 
foreclosure legislation may be more effective than the current regime of 
state regulation.98 Like FAMFA and the UNFA, these articles largely 
recommend regulating the procedural mechanisms associated with a 
foreclosure sale. Instead, federal foreclosure reform should seek to define 
the substantive relationship between the parties, much like the MCOB in 
the United Kingdom. By defining the responsibilities of the parties 
involved in a foreclosure, federal legislation would demystify the rights 
and roles of the parties, while allowing states the opportunity to define 
their own procedural specifics.   
  
III.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 Both the United States and the United Kingdom regulatory systems 
underwent substantial restructuring in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis. While both nations have experienced recent declines in 
foreclosure, 99  it is imperative to understand which regulations are 
responsible for these improvements. The importance of this analysis is 
essential to prevent the repeal of successful regulation in the inevitable 
“race to the bottom” in which nations engage to attract investment.   
 
A. Regulatory Structure 
 
The power to regulate can be a useful, yet crippling tool in its 
effects on an economy. In the case of American foreclosure law, the 
previous regulatory structure to the 2008 financial crisis had been 
dominated by states, with little oversight from the federal government.  
This led to a highly fractured system of different foreclosure procedures, 
confusion for homeowners and lenders, and pseudo-governmental 
agencies that attempted to bring some uniformity to the system. The 
interplay between state regulation and minimal federal oversight was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Id. at 743. 
98 See id. 
99 COUNCIL OF MORTGAGE LENDERS, supra note 47; see also Alex Veiga, Homes Lost to 
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principal cause of the housing bubble and resulting foreclosure 
epidemic.100 This directly affected the regulatory structure in the United 
Kingdom, as both nations sought to make their regulatory schemes more 
favorable to investors.  
Since the 2008 financial crisis, both countries have consolidated 
regulatory power and oversight. In the United Kingdom, a tripartite system 
was replaced by the singular Financial Conduct Authority who, through its 
promulgation of the MCOB, laid down clear and effective rules on 
mortgage regulation.101 Similarly, the Bureau in the United States assumed 
the regulatory responsibilities of several other agencies, and through their 
consolidation, has provided a unified front of enforcement against 
foreclosure abuse.102 The success of a country’s regulatory system is 
highly dependent on accountability and uniformity of enforcement. 
Separation of regulators, lack of enforcement, and differing internal 
regulations lead to forum shopping by investors, which in turn leads to 
questionable lending practices and foreclosure procedures. While the 
current regulatory systems in the United States and the United Kingdom 
seem effective, lawmakers must resist the race to deregulation once the 
concerns of the financial crisis have faded. If they fail to heed these 
lessons of history, we will once again be plunged into financial 
uncertainty. 
 
B. Regulatory Substance 
 
While the regulatory structure in both nations has largely focused 
on centralizing oversight, the substance of the promulgated regulation is 
noticeably different. The two notable differences are (1) that the 
regulations in the United States provide a private right of action under 
certain regulations and (2) that the United Kingdom’s regulations limit its 
content to defining the nature of the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship 
without providing extensive procedural regulations.   
 
 1. Private Rights of Action 
 
The Bureau has provided American consumers with private rights 
of action under certain statutory regulations. Specifically, in 12 U.S.C. § 
2605, which governs mortgage-servicing practices, Congress provided that 
“[w]hoever fails to comply with any provision of this section shall be 
liable to the borrower for each such failure in the following amounts…”103 
However, courts have been reluctant to infer private rights of action in 
other statutory regulations promulgated by the organization. For example, 
12 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2604, which pertain to disclosure requirements on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Brown, supra note 6, at 535.   
101 See Lamb, supra note 33. 
102 Id. 
103 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). 
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lenders, have not been found to include private rights of action. Courts 
have held that violations of these regulations are not actionable by general 
consumers.104 While the Bureau has provided consumers with limited 
direct recourse, these regulations have gone beyond the protections offered 
in the United Kingdom.  
The MCOB does not provide a private right of action under any of 
its regulations.105 Instead, enforcement of foreclosure regulations in the 
United Kingdom is left to the Financial Conduct Authority. As previously 
stated, the Financial Conduct Authority has been granted a variety of tools 
and punishments to enforce its regulations. This has two effects. First, it 
eliminates a multitude of lawsuits that would be filed by disgruntled 
consumers complaining of violations of the MCOB. In the United States, 
the decision to provide private rights of action for certain foreclosure 
regulations ensures that numerous lawsuits will be filed. As the 
regulations promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
arise under federal law, many of these lawsuits end up in federal court. In 
fact, the number of foreclosure suits in federal courts has nearly doubled, 
from 4,267 in 2010 to 8,130 in 2012.106 The added strain of extra cases, 
combined with unduly long delays in appointing new judges, all during a 
time of fiscal austerity for the judiciary, means cases are sometimes 
delayed for years without adjudication.107   
The United Kingdom avoids this issue by centralizing enforcement 
of its regulations with the appropriate regulatory agency. This is, however, 
not without pitfalls of its own. The centralization of enforcement requires 
diligent efforts on the part of the agency, as well as constant and effective 
communication with lenders, servicers, and consumers.   
Like the Bureau, the Financial Conduct Authority provides an 
online consumer complaint process where individuals can seek protection 
and enforcement for regulation violations.108 The number of complaints 
received by each regulatory entity provides perspective on its role in 
enforcement. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority received a 
total of 2.9 million complaints in the first six months of 2013.109 This was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 E.g., Collins v. FMHA–USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1367–68 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 521 
U.S. 1145 (1997); Allan v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, 730 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1976 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010); Delino v. Platinum Community Bank, 628 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1232–33 (S.D. 
Cal. 2009); Bloom v. Martin, 865 F.Supp. 1377, 1384–85 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd on other 
grounds 77 F.3d 318 (9th Cir. 1996). 
105 MCOB, supra note 37. 
106 U.S. DISTRICT COURTS TABLE 4.4, Civil Cases Filed, by Nature of Suit, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/judicial-facts-figures-
2012.aspx. 
107 Gary Martin, Vacancies, Backlogs Plague Federal Judiciary, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 
March 1, 2013, http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Vacancies-backlogs-plague-
federal-judiciary-4321484.php. 
108 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, Complaints and Compensation, available at 
http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/complaints-and-compensation. 




19                                  Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                         Vol. 
19	  
down 15 percent from the last 6 months of 2012.110 By comparison, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau received approximately 176,700 
consumer complaints from July 2011 to June 2013.111 Although the United 
States has approximately five times the population of the United 
Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority receives 16 times more 
complaints in six months than the Bureau had in over a year.112 While the 
regulations between the two entities may seem similar, the enforcement 
and number of complaints could not be more different.   
The second effect of centralized enforcement without granting 
private consumers a private of action is the leveraged ability to collect 
civil penalties from regulation violations. Again, the disparaging 
differences between the two nation’s regulatory agencies provide a unique 
perspective into their respective enforcement ability. During the 
2012/2013 fiscal year, the Financial Conduct Authority collected 
approximately £381.9 million British pounds sterling, or approximately 
$634.3 million U.S. dollars from violations of regulations. 113  In 
comparison, the Bureau collected a mere $32 million for fiscal year 
2012/2013.114   
The differences between the two organizations yearly collections 
are illustrative of their respective effectiveness. As explained above, there 
are a variety of factors that lead to the discrepancy in civil fines assessed 
and collected. Perhaps the most important difference is the lack of private 
enforcement afforded by the MCOB. This has two effects. First, it keeps 
violations of the regulations out of the court system and second, it 
provides a unified mechanism of enforcement, thereby increasing its 
leverage in securing fines. This article would recommend that Congress 
heed the example of the Financial Conduct Authority and eliminate any 
private rights of action under federal foreclosure legislation. Instead, the 
enforcement of federal foreclosure legislation should be serviced by one 
regulatory agency, who would work with consumers to remedy abusive 
practices. In fact, the Bureau already has an extensive online claims 
process like the one featured by the Financial Conduct Authority. While 
consumers may feel they have lost significant power to fight abusive 
practices with the elimination of their ability to sue, however, the data 
suggests that enforcement by an agency would yield greater results.   
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2. Regulatory Complexity 
 
 Another key success to the MCOB has been the substance of the 
regulations promulgated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Specifically, 
their ability to accurately and explicitly define the relationship between 
mortgagees, mortgagors, and mortgage servicers has left little ambiguity 
as to the roles and responsibilities of each party. While providing great 
substantive regulation, the MCOB has largely stayed away from defining 
procedural specifics. This provides homeowners with substantive 
protections without hindering the efforts of financial intuitions in servicing 
the loan. As further addressed below, the current regulatory structure 
under the Bureau contains excessively specific time frames and procedural 
steps, making the regulations overly complex and therefore burdensome. 
  To illustrate the substance of the MCOB, this article will further 
examine section 13.3, entitled “Dealing fairly with customers in arrears.”  
MCOB § 13.3.3A states: 
“In complying with MCOB 13.3.2A R, a firm must give a 
customer a reasonable period of time to consider any 
proposals for dealing with the payment difficulties.” 
While the regulation clearly imposes responsibilities on the lender or 
servicer, it does so without providing overly complex time schemes or 
procedural specifics. Instead, it provides a framework that outlines the 
relationship between the two parties with allowable variances.   
 In comparison, 12 C.F.R § 1024.41(b) provides, in part: 
  “(2) Review of loss mitigation application submission. 
(i) Requirements. If a servicer receives a loss 
mitigation application 45 days or more before a 
foreclosure sale, a servicer shall: 
(A) Promptly upon receipt of a loss 
mitigation application, review the loss 
mitigation application to determine if the 
loss mitigation application is complete; and 
(B) Notify the borrower in writing 
within 5 days (excluding legal public 
holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) 
after receiving the loss mitigation 
application that the servicer 
acknowledges receipt of the loss 
mitigation application and that the 
servicer has determined that the loss 
mitigation application is either 
complete or incomplete. If a loss 
mitigation application is incomplete, 
the notice shall state the additional 
documents and information the 
borrower must submit to make the 
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loss mitigation application complete 
and the applicable date pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section. 
The notice to the borrower shall 
include a statement that the borrower 
should consider contacting servicers 
of any other mortgage loans secured 
by the same property to discuss 
available loss mitigation options.” 
The difference between the two regulations is readily apparent. While both 
regulations concern similar issues or the course of action to be taken if a 
borrower falls behind in payments, RESPA creates a strict timeline for 
which mortgage servicers must adhere. In addition, it also provides 
specific information that must be included in the correspondence. The 
regulations provided by RESPA are overly complex and actually burden 
smaller businesses and lenders who may not have the resources to have an 
attorney constantly advising them of regulation specifics.115 
 The regulations propounded by the Bureau may sound effective in 
theory, but the realistic consequences of providing overly specific 
regulations are the burdening of business.116 Another effect of overly 
complex regulation, even at the state level, is added costs to homeowners 
and new homebuyers.117 Specifically, the Federal Housing Administration 
announced in December of 2013 that it eliminated the “across-the-board 
adverse-market fee instituted in 2008 to help cover the costs of high rates 
of delinquencies.”118 However, the agency did not eliminate this fee in 
states with foreclosure timelines that remained stubbornly long.119 An 
analysis by Mark Fleming of CoreLogic, a real estate data service, found 
that foreclosures in judicial states took 46 percent longer to complete than 
a foreclosure in a non-judicial state.120 Further, a study conducted by the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency in 2013 found “the dramatic increases in 
timelines seen in certain states have created fundamentally unfair cross 
subsidies between borrowers in different states, because the current 
pricing regime fails to account for the material difference in the risk of 
loss across states.”121 
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 The statistics above highlight the complexities of regulation in our 
federal system. In the United Kingdom, where the “state” system is largely 
non-existent, multiple levels of government regulation and legislation on 
the same issue does not exist. However, in the United States, where the 
states have rights to regulate the foreclosure process and the federal 
government also has authority to regulate foreclosures, numerous 
opportunities for regulations to conflict exist. This in turn, leads to 
disparate impacts across the nation. In order to avoid discrepancies and 
inconsistencies in foreclosure legislation, lawmakers and regulators should 
create as little disunity as possible by eliminating some of the many levels 
of regulation. One way this can be done is by simplifying the regulations 
that are produced nationally by avoiding specifics that might run counter 
to local regulations. If the federal regulations, like the MCOB, provide 
broad generalized guidelines for the duties and responsibilities of the 
parties, the states could work out the specifics as they see fit. Not only 
would this lead to less confusing and burdensome legislation, it would 
conform to the principles of federalism, leaving local controversies to the 
states.   
 
 
IV.  CURRENT FORECLOSURE TRENDS 
 
 A. Developments in the United States 
 
 While foreclosure rates have been on the decline, some states are 
still struggling with stubbornly high rates of foreclosure. In an attempt to 
combat this, one state in particular has taken aggressive action. On 
January 1, 2013, the California Homeowner Bill of Rights took effect, 
granting homeowners in the state larger protections against abusive bank 
practices. 122  The legislation provides four major protections for 
homeowners: (1) a lender cannot engage in dual-tracking, or the process of 
pursuing a foreclosure action while a loan modification application has 
been submitted; (2) lenders must provide homeowners with a single point 
of contact; (3) penalties for “robo-signing,” where a creditor fails to read a 
document that a computer has signed; and (4) homeowners have a private 
right of action to sue for violations.123 The effects of California’s new 
legislation have had mixed results. Specifically, while foreclosures have 
reduced dramatically since the passage of this legislation and property 
values are on the rise, the long-term effects have yet to be seen. The 
increased regulatory “hoops” that lenders and servicers must jump through 
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will inevitably lead to higher fees and costs for homeowners.124 In fact, the 
increase in regulations may force lenders to pursue more judicial 
foreclosures in California for the safety of judicial oversight, thereby 
limiting their potential civil liability for possible violations of the 
foreclosure regulations.125 
 Another recent development in the American foreclosure 
landscape has been the rise of the servicer. As previously discussed, 
mortgage servicers are not lenders of the loan, but rather a company that 
handles the day to day management of the loan in place of the original 
lender. In fact, “[]ervicing companies like Nationstar and Ocwen Financial 
now [account for] 17 percent of the mortgage servicing market, up from 3 
percent in 2010…”126 Both California and New York have received sharp 
rises in complaints over abusive practices by mortgage servicing 
companies.127 The addition of another player in the foreclosure realm adds 
yet another layer of complexity to an already complex system. The cause 
of increased participation by servicers has largely been attributed to the 
added costs on lenders to navigate the new foreclosure regulations and 
procedures.128 This has “further diminish[ed] the bank’s appetite for the 
business [of servicing].” 129  While a rebounding economy and new 
regulations seem promising, only time will tell if these new developments 
are here to stay.   
 
 
 B. Developments in the United Kingdom 
 
 As previously stated, the United Kingdom has seen a steady 
decline of foreclosures, coined “repossessions,” since the advent of the 
foreclosure crisis. In fact, the foreclosure rate in the United Kingdom is at 
its lowest point in the past six years.130 While the foreclosure rate has been 
effectively managed in the United Kingdom, it is not without problems of 
its own. The rate of foreclosure in some areas of the United Kingdom still 
remains comparatively high.131 Specifically, different parts of London 
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have experienced different levels of foreclosure rates since the financial 
crisis. For example, “[t]here is still a long way to go before the northern 
property market returns to its pre-recession health, and all the while the 
north is still playing catch-up, and falling further and further behind the 
south."132 This north-south divide may be demonstrative of a larger issue 
the United Kingdom faces: a growing income inequality gap. With income 
inequality also on the rise in the United States, this will be another issue 




V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The United States and the United Kingdom both suffered from the 
financial collapse of 2008, but one country suffered less in the aftermath 
than the other. While both countries have unique systems of government, 
they share a rich history and a common-law legal system. In fact, many 
principles of American law were directly incorporated from the English 
system and commonalities can still be seen in today’s contemporary legal 
landscape. This article proposes that Americans look once again across the 
ocean to their English counterparts in order to better understand the 
successes and failures of a highly regulated market. The country that can 
adapt to the changing world will be successful, and adaptation requires 
diligent awareness of competitors. That being said, not every reform or 
regulation in the United Kingdom will remedy the issues here in the 
United States, but if a comparative analysis can yield even one 
improvement, than it is worth examining. Lawmakers, lawyers, and law 
students alike should heed the lessons of our British counterparts. After 
all, there may be some British cures for our American foreclosure woes.    
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